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CASE COMMENTS
ADVERSE POSSESSION: SUFFICIENCY OF ALLEGATIONS IN
BILL OF PARTICULARS TO SHOW INTENT TO CLAIM
ADVERSELY
Drawdy Investment Co. v. Leonard, 29 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1947)
Plaintiff was record owner of all of the odd-numbered sections of two
adjoining townships. Defendant was a grantee of lands located within
some of the even-numbered sections of the same two townships. Defendant
in 1938 went into possession of his land. Four years later, plaintiff, claiming to have established title by adverse possession to defendant's land
during the twenty-one year period prior to 1938, instituted an action of
ejectment against defendant. Plaintiff filed a bill of particulars,' alleging
that its claim originated in 1917 and that it had continuously protected
all of the land within the entire two townships by a substantial enclosure
sufficient to indicate a claim of ownership to all the inclosed land.
Plaintiff alleged further that it had actually occupied and used all of the
land within the two townships as cattle pastures to the exclusion of all
others; that it had established improvements in the manner usual in the
locality according to the purposes for which the property was adapted;
and that its possession was open, uninterrupted, notorious, hostile, and
exclusive of any other right. Upon defendant's motion for judgment on the
bill of particulars as finally amended, it was adjudged that the defendant
was not guilty of unlawfully withholding from plaintiff these lands. Plaintiff appealed. HELD, the bill of particulars failed to show a claim of right
by the plaintiff which had ripened into title by adverse possession. Since
plaintiff did not allege that it went into possession with intent to acquire
title to these lands, its allegations sustain the conclusion that it held for its
own convenience as well as the conclusion that it held with intent to
claim by adverse possession. Judgment affirmed, Associate Justice Harrison dissenting.
1

Florida Common Law Court Rule 85(a), "... If a party relies upon a claim of
right without color of title, such bill of particulars shall so state and specify how and
when such claim originated and the facts upon which such claim is based .......
[2 1
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CASE COMMENTS
It is well settled that a landowner may acquire title by adverse possession to adjoining land by inclosing both tracts within a substantial inclosure, providing he intends to claim ownership of all of the inclosed
land.2 The decision in the present case casts no doubt upon this rule of
substantive law, but it does concern the manner in which the intent must
be stated in the bill of particulars. Treating the bill of particulars as a
part of the pleading, as the court apparently does,3 the bill would necessarily be tested by the principle of pleading that, if two meanings present
themselves, that construction most unfavorable to the pleader will be
adopted. 4 However, before this principle is applied, the pleader is entitled to the benefit of the maxim that there need be no direct allegation
of a fact which is necessarily implied from other averments. 5 Where terms
are used which in their legal significance include other terms, the latter will
be deemed to appear in the pleading. 6 Since plaintiff alleged a claim of
ownership, a term which is usually held to be synonymous with an intent
to hold adversely, 7 the averment should have constituted an adequate
allegation of intent. An allegation of notorious, adverse, open, and exclusive possession has in another jurisdiction been held sufficient, for the
reason that it alleges substantially, or implies at least, that the land was
held with an intent to claim ownership. 8 Thus plaintiff's bill of particulars
2

Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Fla. 261, 14 So. 805 (1894).
'Accord, as to the bill of particulars in suits on bonds, notes, bills, covenants, contracts and accounts, Florida Common Law Court Rule 16; but cf., Wauchula Development Co. v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 86 Fla. 298, 98 So. 220 (1923) ; State
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 56 Fla. 670, 47 So. 986 (1908); Dorman v. Bigelow, 1 Fla.
281, 296 (1847), which held that the bill of particulars was not a part of the p'eading
in suits on bonds, notes, bills, covenants, contracts, and accounts at common law and
under former Florida Common Law Court Rule 14 which, similar to Rule 85 under
discussion, did not declare the bill of particulars to be a part of the pleading.
'Hazen v. Cobb, 96 Fla. 151, 117 So. 853 (1928); Sewell v. Huffstetler, 83 Fla.
629, 93 So. 162 (1922); Standard Phosphate Co. v. Lunn, 66 Fla. 220, 63 So. 429
(1913); STEPas, PRmcipLzs oF PLEADmNG n Ciu AcrioNs 382 (Andrews' ed. 1894).
'Copeland v. Dunehoo, 36 Ga. App. 817, 138 S. E. 267 (1927); McBride v. Scott,
125 Mich. 517, 84 N. IV. 1079 (1901); STEPHENS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 366.
'Smith v. Waite, 103 CaL 372, 37 Pac. 232 (1894); Topping v. Clay, 65 Minn.
346, 68 N. W. 34 (1896); Nicholas v. Farwell, 24 Neb. 180, 38 N. W. 820 (1888);
STmEnzs, op. cit. supra note 4, at 367.
'Guaranty Title & Trust Corp. v. United States, 264 U. S. 200, 204 (1924); Bond
v. O'Gara, 177 Mass. 139, 58 N. E. 275 (1900); Carpenter v. Coles, 75 Minn. 9, 77
N. W. 424 (1898).
'Whitaker v. Jenkins, 138 N. C. 476, 51 S. E. 104 (1905).
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would be susceptible to only one meaning: that it had alleged the necessary intent. Whether plaintiff actually had that intent or merely held
possession for its own convenience is a question of fact for the jury.9
Although the decision can be justified on another ground,' 0 the court-by
construing the pleading most unfavorably to the plaintiff and by omitting
to give plaintiff the benefit of facts necessarily implied-adopted a highly
technical attitude toward matters of pleading that resulted in a decision by
the court of the jury question of intent.
ALLEN CROUCH

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT: WHAT CONSTITUTES PRACTICE
OF LAW BY AN ACCOUNTANT?
In re Bercu, 69 N. Y. S.2d 730 (Sup. Ct. 1947)
Respondent, a certified public accountant, was consulted by a client
regarding federal income tax matters and undertook for remuneration
to study the reported decisions and departmental rulings on the subject
and to render an opinion thereon. Respondent was not engaged in an
audit of the books or in the preparation of a tax return. The New York
County Lawyers Association, contending that respondent had rendered
counsel involving legal research and that this constituted the unauthorized practice of law, petitioned the New York Supreme Court to have
him adjudged in contempt of court.' Respondent maintained that he had
merely given his opinion as an accountant on the decisions and law
applicable to federal tax accounting. HELD, since the respondent limited
his research and advice to principles of proper accounting, to a study of
the tax law, and to the court decisions and departmental rulings on the

'Rountree v. Jackson, 242 Ala. 190, 4 So.2d 743 (1941); Sullivan v. Huber, 209
Minn. 592, 297 N. W. 33 (1941) ; Romine v. West, 134 Neb. 274, 278 N. W. 490 (1938).
"That the bill of particulars described an enclosure composed of natural barriers
which could be held, within the discretion of the court, inadequate to give notice to
defendant, or any one else, that plaintiff was asserting an adverse claim, Drawdy
Investment Co. v. Leonard, 29 So.2d 198, 203 (Fla. 1947); accord, Brumagim v.
Bradshaw, 39 Cal. 24 (1870).
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